From the Tribune:
Ryan jury shake-up could stand up on appeal, experts say
By Michael Higgins
Tribune staff reporter
Published April 19, 2006, 10:50 PM CDT
A federal judge's decision to remove some jurors, but not others, from the
trial of former Gov. George Ryan might well stand up on appeal, provided she wasn't
influenced by how those particular jurors viewed the merits of the case, legal
experts say.
Court records unsealed Wednesday show that Ryan's lawyers repeatedly challenged
U.S. District Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer's rulings regarding the removal of jurors
accused of lying on their jury questionnaires, characterizing her decisions as
inconsistent and unfair.
Prosecutors backed Pallmeyer, arguing that she had good reason for treating
some jurors' misstatements differently than others.
How would an appeals court see the issue? Some experts say appellate judges
are not likely to overturn Ryan's conviction as long as Pallmeyer made her decisions
without considering a juror's view of the case.
The complete answer to how much Pallmeyer knew about the jurors' views and
how she treated that information may not become clear until Pallmeyer unseals
juror notes and transcripts of juror interviews.
Steven A. Miller, a former federal prosecutor, said it is highly unlikely
the judge would have asked jurors their views of the case.
Ryan's defense team, however, has argued that the sealed material will help
their case. "That seal will be lifted," defense lawyer Dan Webb said
Monday after Ryan was convicted, "and you all can make your judgment yourself
about how unusual the developments have been during [these] jury deliberations."
Legal experts agree that it's not really important what the former jurors
say about the case now, but only what Pallmeyer knew at the time.
For example, Pallmeyer decided to remove juror Evelyn Ezell, with whom other
jurors had quarreled, for failing to disclose an arrest record. That ruling won't
be second-guessed simply because Ezell now says she would have opposed the guilty-on-all-counts
decision.
Pallmeyer decided to keep forewoman Sonja Chambers on the jury even though
she had not disclosed her involvement in some civil cases. That ruling probably
won't cause trouble on appeal merely because Chambers later voted for conviction.
The legal system generally doesn't use a juror's after-the-fact statements
as grounds to overturn a conviction. "That would unsettle every case, civil
and criminal," said Thomas Sullivan, former U.S. attorney in Chicago.
But "if the judge had reason to think that [Ezell] differed from other
jurors on her view of the merits, then there's a problem," said Al Alschuler,
law professor at the University of Chicago.
The issue has come up in previous cases. In 1999, a federal appeals court
overturned the bank fraud conviction of another one-time governor, Fife Symington
of Arizona, on similar grounds.
In that case, a judge had removed a juror during deliberations because other
jurors complained that the woman would not deliberate. One complaining juror said
the jury was heading for a "an undecided vote, a hung jury."
The trial judge dismissed the holdout juror. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed Symington's conviction, stating that "because it was
reasonably possible that the impetus for [the juror's] dismissal came from her
position on the merits of the case, it was error to dismiss her."
In 2004, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction of Timothy
Gallano, a Bourbonnais man who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to 60
years in prison.
During deliberations at Gallano's trial, a juror wrote a note stating that
he disagreed with his fellow jurors. "My mind cannot be changed because I
feel some reasonable doubt," the juror wrote.
After the note appeared, prosecutors conducted a background check of the
holdout juror and found that he had failed to disclose arrests for burglary, assault,
armed robbery, kidnapping and other charges. Prosecutors asked Cook County Circuit
Judge Frank Zelezinski to remove the juror, and the judge agreed.
Gallano was convicted. The Appeals Court ruled that the prosecution had
conceded that "the impetus for its investigation ... was the knowledge that
[the juror] was the lone holdout juror."